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Statement by National Security Leaders on the Announcement
of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
July 20, 2015
We applaud the announcement that a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has
been reached with Iran to limit its nuclear program. We congratulate President Obama and
all the negotiators for a landmark agreement unprecedented in its importance for preventing
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran.
Though primarily a nonproliferation agreement, the JCPOA has significant implications for
some of Americas most important national objectives: regional stability in the Middle East,
Israels security, dealing with an untrustworthy and hostile nation, and U.S. leadership on major
global challenges.
This JCPOA will put in place a set of constraints and monitoring measures that will help to
assure that Irans nuclear program will be for peaceful purposes only. Major U.S. objectives
have been achieved: uranium enrichment limited to 3.67% and only at the Natanz plant; the Arak
reactor will be re-designed to minimize the amount of plutonium produced and Iran is barred
from separating plutonium and all spent fuel will be removed from Iran; a 98% reduction in Irans
stockpile of low enriched uranium for 15 years; unprecedented surveillance of nuclear activities
and control of nuclear related imports; a two-thirds reduction in the installed centrifuges for ten
years; constraints on research and development of advanced centrifuges. The agreement will set
up a highly effective multilayered program to monitor and inspect every aspect of Irans nuclear
supply chain and fuel cycle, including continuous monitoring at some sites for 20-25 years, and
permit inspections on short notice. We have followed carefully the negotiations as they have
progressed and conclude that the JCPOA represents the achievement of greater security for us
and our partners in the region.
We acknowledge that the JCPOA does not achieve all of the goals its current detractors
have set for it. But it does meet all of the key objectives. Most importantly, should Iran violate the
agreement and move toward building nuclear weapons, it will be discovered early and in sufficient
time for strong countermeasures to be taken to stop Iran. No agreement between multiple parties
can be a perfect agreement without risks. We believe without this agreement, the risks to the security
of the U.S. and its friends would be far greater. We have also not heard any viable alternatives from
those who oppose the implementation of the JCPOA.
We, the undersigned, have devoted our careers to the peace and security of the United
States in both Republican and Democratic Administrations. U.S. presidents and Congresses over
the past 20 years have joined in a bipartisan policy of sanctioning and isolating Iran to prevent a
nuclear weapon. There was bipartisan understanding that when the Iranians indicated a readiness to
talk the U.S. would lead the negotiations to test Irans seriousness. Indeed the Corker-Cardin legislation, which was approved this past spring by an overwhelming bipartisan vote in both the House and
Senate was signed into law by the President, defines the review process that the Congress will use
over the coming months. Members of both political parties can deservedly take credit for bringing
us to this moment.
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We welcome the discussion that will unfold over the merits of this agreement. We urge members
of Congress to be closely involved in the oversight, monitoring and enforcement of this agreement.
As Congress was so diligent and constructive in pressing forward the highly effective sanctions regime
that helped get Iran to the table, it must now play a key role in the implementation of the agreement
which they helped bring about. Congressional approval will eventually be required to lift sanctions
under the agreement. Arrangements now need to be made to assure that Congress is a full partner
in its implementation.
Those who advocate rejection of the JCPOA should evaluate whether there is a feasible alternative
for better protecting U.S. security and more effectively preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. The consequences of rejection are grave: the unraveling of international sanctions; U.S.
responsibility for the collapse of the agreement; and the possible development of an Iranian nuclear
weapon under significantly reduced or no inspections. A rejection of the agreement could leave the
U.S. with the only alternative of having to use military force unilaterally in the future.
We call on the Administration to place the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in a strategic
context: assuring our partners in the region that the United States remains fully committed to
their defense and to countering any destabilizing Iranian actions in the region. We also call on the
Administration, with the express support of the Congress, to make clear that it will remain the
firm policy of the United States, during the agreements initial 10 to 15 years as well as after key
restrictions expire, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by all available means.
We will join in a bipartisan effort to formulate a balanced and objective assessment and
implementation of this agreement. We are committed to building an effective strategy for its full
implementation. This effort will be critical in view of the agreements significance for the protection
of the security of the U.S. and its friends and for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Amb. (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and Ambassador to
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Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and Secretary of States Special Advisor for
Amb. (ret.) Stuart E. Eizenstat, Deputy Treasury Secretary and Department of States Special Envoy for
Vali Nasr, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Dean of Johns Hopkins University SAIS
Richard Nephew, Director for Iran, National Security Council and Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at
Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Chairman National Intelligence Council
Paul ONeill, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
Admiral (ret.) Eric Olson, U.S. Navy and Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
William Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense
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Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, and Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, United Nations, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan
Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan, Philippines, and Zambia
Joe R. Reeder, Deputy Secretary of the Army and Chairman of the Panama Canal Commission
Donald W. Riegle, U.S. Senator
William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration and President National
Amb. (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research and Ambassador to China,
Barnett R. Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Gen. (ret.) Brent Scowcroft, U.S. National Security Advisor
RADM (ret.) Joe Sestak, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs
Gary Sick, National Security Council Member for Iran and the Persian Gulf
Jim Slattery, U.S. House of Representatives
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning, the Department of State
Mark Udall, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia and
Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates
James Walsh, Research Associate at MITs Security Studies Program
Col. (ret.) Lawrence Wilkerson, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State
Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator
Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs and Ambassador to India,
* The signers of this statement were either former senior officials of the U.S. government or prominent national
security leaders who have not held senior government positions. The positions listed after the names of the former
government officials are senior posts held while in office. The positions listed after the names of those who were
not from the government are listed with their current position.
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